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THE HAZELWOOD MINE FIRE 2014 
 
David Cliff1 
ABSTRACT: On 9 February 2014 a fire began in the open cut brown coal mine at Hazelwood near 
Morwell in Victoria. This fire burnt for 45 days before it was extinguished. The fire necessitated the 
evacuation of parts of Morwell and required a major coordinated fire-fighting effort. The severity of the 
fire and the impact upon the local community caused the Victorian Government to institute a Board of 
Inquiry (Teague et al., 2014). This paper discusses the information presented to the Board of Inquiry into 
this fire and the conclusions and recommendation of the Inquiry, focussing on what caused the fire and 
what could be done to prevent a recurrence. This paper draws heavily on the Board’s published report of 




The Latrobe Valley coal reserves are unique and are characterised by a relatively thin layer of soil and 
clay overburden covering massive coal seams that are on average 100 metres thick. This makes 
accessing the vast brown coal reserves in the Latrobe Valley relatively easy compared with elsewhere in 
the world. 
 
The Hazelwood Mine provides approximately 25 per cent of Victoria’s baseline electricity supply. Coal 
was first discovered at Morwell were discovered in the late nineteenth century by the Great Morwell Coal 
Mining Company. The State Electricity Commission of Victoria (SECV) acquired the Hazelwood mine 
site in 1924. The SECV established the Hazelwood mine, then known as the Morwell Open Cut in 1949, 
in order to supply brown coal to the adjoining briquette works, to supply the increase in power demands 
post world war two. Mining operations initially commenced in 1955 in what is now known as the east 
field, bounded at the north by the northern batters. 
 
The Hazelwood mine was further developed from the late 1950s. Between 1964 and 1971, the 
Hazelwood Power Station was built and demand for coal from the Hazelwood mine increased 
dramatically. The Hazelwood pondage was constructed in the early 1970s to establish a supply of 
cooling water for the Hazelwood Power Station. Mining of the east field continued until about 1980. The 
Hazelwood mine then expanded to the south-west, then to the south-east and then west again, where 
the operational area of the mine is now situated. Under the current proposed mining schedule, mining at 
the Hazelwood mine will continue to the west and then to the north before the anticipated closure of the 
mine in 2031. 
 
The Victorian Government privatised the SECV in the early to mid-1990s, and its power stations were 
sold separately to overseas interests.  
 
The Hazelwood mine, including the land on which it operates, is owned by the Hazelwood Power 
Partnership. Since 7 June 2013, the four partners have been subsidiaries of International Power 
(Australia) Holdings Pty Ltd. This company is in turn jointly owned by subsidiaries of GDF Suez S.A. (72 
per cent ownership) and Mitsui & Co Ltd (28 per cent ownership). GDF Suez S.A. is a global energy 
company with corporate headquarters in France. 
  
Fire is a well-known occurrence in mines in the Latrobe Valley, and there have been a number of fires in 
the past ten years at the Hazelwood mine, most recently in 2005, 2006 and 2008. On each of these 
occasions the fire initiated in a single location, rapidly increased in size, fanned by strong winds and took 




The Latrobe Valley currently contains three huge open cut brown coal mines. Open cut brown coal 
mines are particularly vulnerable to fire.  Laboratory reactivity tests place the coal in the exceptionally 
high category (Beamish and Arisoy, 2008) due to its low rank. The coal is only stable when wet (inherent 
moisture is about 60 % by weight). If the coal was dried, any fire initiated in the coal would spread 
quickly and be difficult to extinguish. The coal is not stockpiled but burnt as soon as possible after being 
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mined. Hazelwood open cut mine is shown in figure 1. The mine stretches approximately 5km from west 
to east and about 2.5 km from south to north at the widest point. The area being extracted is located in 




Figure 1: Aerial view of the mine (Teague et al., 2014) 
 
THE EVENT 
Victoria experienced one of its hottest and driest summers on record in 2014. In mid-January 2014, 
Melbourne endured its most prolonged heatwave since 1908, with four consecutive days over 40°C. 
Between 7 and 9 February 2014, emergency services and firefighting resources were committed to 
responding to multiple significant fires across the State and within the Latrobe Valley. The Fire Services 
Commissioner and the Chief Health Officer made several announcements warning the community about 
the potential for extreme weather conditions and associated fire and health risks. On 9 February 2014, 
the entire State of Victoria was facing the most extreme weather conditions since Black Saturday.  
 
This weather had the effect of drying out the abandoned areas of the mine leaving the exposed batters 
in the north and east in a reactive state. The predominant wind at this time came from the 
north-west/south-west that would tend to fan any fire along the exposed batters and the abandoned area 
of the mine. 
 
The Hazelwood mine fire that began on 9 February 2014 was the largest and longest burning mine fire 
that has occurred in the Latrobe Valley to date. The fire was not a spontaneous combustion event. The 
fire was probably caused by embers spotting into the Hazelwood mine from bushfires burning in close 
proximity to the mine. The mine fire burned for 45 days and sent smoke and ash over the town of 
Morwell and surrounding areas for much of that time.  
 
The Hazelwood mine fire was not only a major complex fire emergency but also posed a serious public 
health emergency.  
 
The impact of the Hazelwood mine fire on the Latrobe Valley community has been significant. People 
have been affected in many ways. First and foremost, the community has experienced adverse health 
effects and may be affected for an indeterminate period into the future.  
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In addition there have been significant financial impacts on many people, including medical costs, 
veterinary costs, time taken off work, relocation from their homes and cleaning their homes. Local 
businesses have suffered a downturn in business, and the costs of cleaning their businesses. There is 
also the possible decrease in property values. 
  
It is impossible to quantify the cost of the Hazelwood mine fire, but the Board of Inquiry estimated the 
total cost borne by the Victorian Government, the local community and the operator of the Hazelwood 
mine, GDF Suez, exceeds $100 million.  
 
During the Inquiry, the State and GDF Suez expressed a commitment to undertake numerous additional 
actions in response to the Hazelwood mine fire. The Board of Inquiry made 18 recommendations to the 
State and GDF Suez, which have been drafted taking into account the feasibility of implementation, as 
well as the issues raised by the Latrobe Valley community.  
 
THE SOURCE OF THE FIRE 
 
The Hazelwood mine fire was not just one fire, it started as a series of smaller fires that ignited in the 
northern, eastern and south-eastern batters and floor of the Hazelwood mine on 9 February 2014. 
  
There is difficulty in determining with precision which of the external fires was responsible for the 
spotting of embers into the mine. On the evidence provided, spotting from the Hernes Oak fire was the 
more likely cause of the Hazelwood mine fire, while spotting from the Driffield fire may have also 
contributed. Both the Hernes Oak fire and the Driffield fire are regarded by Victoria Police as suspicious 
and both are the subject of ongoing investigation.  
 
The probability of embers spotting into the Hazelwood mine was supported by clear evidence from 
several mine employees, contemporaneous photographs and video, expert evidence and computer 
simulations of likely fire behaviour on 9 February 2014. Figure 2 shows possible fire sources and area of 




Figure 2: Possible sources of the fire and areas of the mine that burnt (Teauge et al., 2014) 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE INQUIRY AND COMMENTS 
 
The discussion on the causes of the fire and what can be done to minimise the potential for a repeat 
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including mitigating any potential consequences is best framed in terms of the recommendations of the 
Board of Inquiry. 
The recommendations of the inquiry focus in two different areas: the State and GDF Suez, the operator 
of the mine. The term ‘State’ is used broadly in the recommendations to refer to the Victorian 
Government, the Victorian public service, and public entities such as Emergency Management Victoria, 
the Country Fire Authority, the Environment Protection Authority and the Victorian WorkCover Authority.  
Recommendations relevant to the State are generally not prescriptive in terms of the entity tasked with 
implementation.  
  
The first recommendation relates to mandating a plan to implement the recommendations of the Inquiry 




The State empowers and require the Auditor-General or another appropriate agency, to: 
 oversee the implementation of these recommendations and the commitments made by the 
State and GDF Suez during this Inquiry; and 
 report publicly every year for the next three years on the progress made in implementing 
recommendations and commitments. 
 
The next two recommendations relate to the need to improve the rapidity and complexity of the response 
to an incident by external agencies. It is interesting to note that most Queensland coal mines operate 
emergency response plans based upon the Australasian Inter-service Incident Management System 




The State establish, for any future incident, integrated incident management teams with 
GDF Suez and other Victorian essential industry providers, to: 
 require that emergency services personnel work with GDF Suez and other appropriate essential 
industry providers; and 




The State enact legislation, to: 
 require Integrated Fire Management Planning; and 
 authorise the Emergency Management Commissioner to develop and implement regional and 
municipal fire management plans. 
 
The next recommendation enhances the capacity of the legislation to consider the potential impacts of 





 bring forward the commencement date of s.16 of the Mineral Resources (Sustainable 
     Development) Amendment Act 2014 (Vic), to facilitate the requirement that approved work 
plans specifically address fire prevention, mitigation and suppression; and 
 acquire the expertise necessary to monitor and enforce compliance with fire risk measures 
adopted by the Victorian coal mining industry under both the mine licensing and occupational 
health and safety regimes. 
 
One of the major issues identified was the time taken to assess the potential health impact of the smoke 
from the fire on the population of Morwell. In particular the capacity to assess the potential health 
impacts from fine particles sub 2.5 micrometres in diameter (PM 2.5) was recognised as being 
inadequate. The Victorian EPA was not equipped to respond to the monitoring requirements of such a 
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fire. Further, it was recognised that more work was needed to quantify the potential health impacts and 
to try to establish a full national ambient air quality standard for PM2.5 rather than the current advisory 
standard. The potential exposure of fire fighters to carbon monoxide from the fire was also a concern to 
the Inquiry. Due to the level of uncertainty of the potential health impacts on the local population the 




The State equip itself to undertake rapid air quality monitoring in any location in Victoria, to: 
 collect all relevant data, including data on PM2.5, carbon monoxide and ozone; and 








The State review and revise the community carbon monoxide response protocol and the firefighter 
carbon monoxide response protocol, to: 
 ensure both protocols are consistent with each other; 
 ensure both protocols include assessment methods and trigger points for specific responses; 
 ensure GDF Suez and other appropriate essential industry providers are required to adopt and 
apply the firefighter carbon monoxide protocol; and 
 inform all firefighters about the dangers of carbon monoxide poisoning, and in particular 




The State review and revise the Bushfire Smoke Protocol and the PM2.5 Health Protection Protocol, to: 
 ensure both protocols are consistent with each other; and 




The State develop and widely disseminate an integrated State Smoke Guide, to: 
 
 incorporate the proposed State Smoke Plan for the management of public health impacts from 
large scale, extended smoke events; 
 include updated Bushfire Smoke, carbon monoxide and PM2.5 protocols; and 
 provide practical advice and support materials to employers, communities and individuals on 




The State should continue the long-term health study, and: 
 
 extend the study to at least 20 years; 
 appoint an independent board, which includes Latrobe Valley community representatives, to 
govern the study; and 
 direct that the independent board publish regular progress reports. 
 
Communications during the fire came under close scrutiny and there were a number of instances where 
inadequate communications occurred between the various emergency response agencies and also by 
the agencies with the public. Appropriate risk communication with the public is difficult to achieve and 
relates not just to information but establishing and maintaining trust so that the information is accepted. 
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Recommendation 11 
 
The State review and revise its communication strategy, to: 
 
 ensure all emergency response agencies have, or have access to, the capability and resources 
needed for effective and rapid public communications during an emergency; and 
 ensure, where appropriate, that private operators of essential infrastructure are included in the 




The State, led by Emergency Management Victoria, develop a community engagement model for 
emergency management to ensure all State agencies and local governments engage with communities 
and already identified trusted networks as an integral component of emergency management planning. 
 
The remaining recommendations relate to improving the capacity of the mine operator to prevent and 
control such an event in the future.  Some of the recommendations relate to improved capacity in terms 
of preparedness and equipment redundancy whilst others relate to improved planning and risk 




GDF Suez revise its Emergency Response Plan, to: 
 require an increased state of readiness on days of Total Fire Ban; 
 require pre-establishment of an Emergency Command Centre; 
 require pre-positioning of an accredited Incident Controller as Emergency Commander; and 
 require any persons nominated as Emergency Commander to have incident controller 





GDF Suez establish enhanced back-up power supply arrangements that do not depend wholly on mains 
power, to: 
 ensure that the Emergency Command Centre can continue to operate if mains power is lost; 
and 
 ensure that the reticulated fire services water system can operate with minimal disruption if 





 conduct, assisted by an independent consultant, a risk assessment of the likelihood and 
consequences of fire in the worked out areas of the Hazelwood mine, and an assessment of the 
most effective fire protection for the exposed coal surfaces; 
 prepare an implementation plan that ensures the most effective and reasonably practicable 
controls are in place to eliminate or reduce the risk of fire; and 





 review its ‘Mine Fire Service Policy and Code of Practice’ so that it reflects industry best practice 
and ensures that, by taking a risk management approach, it is suitable for fire prevention, 
mitigation and suppression in all parts of the Hazelwood mine; and 
 incorporate the revised ‘Mine Fire Service Policy and Code of Practice’ into the approved work 
plan for the Hazelwood mine. 
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Recommendation 17 
 
GDF Suez adopt and apply the firefighter carbon monoxide response protocol. 
Recommendation 18 
 
GDF Suez improve its crisis management communication strategy for the Hazelwood mine in line with 




The fire in the open cut at Hazelwood in February 2014 caused major disruption to the local community 
as well as major costs to the state. The Board of Inquiry established to inquire into the incident found 
that there were major deficiencies in the way the fire was treated. The Board of Inquiry did not accept the 
position of the mine operator that the fire was not reasonably predictable – a “Perfect Storm”. It found 
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